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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, businesses selling products to other companies operated
comfortably within the purported distinction between contract and tort law.'
The agreement between the parties typically served as the sole source of their
respective obligations, as supplemented by the Uniform Sales Act or the
superceding Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Thus, warranties concerning the product could be identified or disclaimed, and remedies for a malfunctioning product could be limited by or liquidated in the contract. Plaintiffs
had to be in privity with defendants to bring suit, and damages were usually
limited to replacement or repair of the product itself. Recovery of any consequential damages (such as lost profits) were limited to those contemplated
by the parties or which were the foreseeable result of a breach of the agree* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati, College of Law.
B.A., Wright State University (1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981). I wish
to thank Professors 0. Fred Harris, Jr., Joseph Tomain, Gary T. Schwartz, and
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this
article.

1. See W.

KEETON,

D.

DOBBS, R. KEETON

& D.

OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON

§ 92 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS] (discussing
common law distinctions between recovery under tort and contract law).
ON TORTS

977
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ment. 2 Tort liability, with its notions of duty imposed by law, proximate
cause, and compensatory damages, had little if any relevance to this scheme.
In contrast, businesses in the consumer product market after the second
World War were increasingly faced with court decisions limiting or eliminating barriers to contract or warranty suits for personal injuries resulting
from use of the product. Eventually, contractual remedies were superceded
3
entirely by tort causes of action sounding in negligence and strict liability.

Indeed, the apparent reluctance of courts to apply tort law to suits for damage
to the product itself, or consequential, non-personal injury (usually characterized as "economic") damages flowing therefrom, was often thought anomalous in light of these developments. 4 Over two decades ago, courts finally
began to address the issue.
The leading cases on this point were decided within four months of each
other in 1965. In the first, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,- the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a buyer of defective carpeting could recover
in strict liability for damage to the product itself. In contrast, the California
Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co., 6 held that the U.C.C., not tort
law, provided the sole means of recovery for a plaintiff suffering monetary
loss from replacement of a malfunctioning truck and loss of profits. The
Seely approach has been adopted by most jurisdictions, 7 and it was recently
followed by the United States Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp.
v. TransamericaDelaval, Inc.,8 an admiralty case where the Court was for-

mulating a "common law" for use by federal courts in that context.
These developments have important implications for transactions between sophisticated parties. On the one hand, most businesses in commercial
disputes involving products will be free from the spectre of tort suits, and
need only be concerned with the application of and defenses under the U.C.C.
2. This rule is derived from the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley has "won universal acceptance in the common
law world." J. CALAmuu & J. PERmLo, LAW OF CONTRACTS 523 (2d ed. 1977). As
Professor Farnsworth notes, the "result [of Hadley] was to impose a more severe
limitation on the recovery of damages for breach of contract than that applicable to
actions in tort or for breach of warranty, in which substantial or proximate cause is
the test." E. FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14, at 875 (1982) (footnote omitted).
3. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, ch. 17.
4. See Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in
American ProductsLiability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 648 (1977); Rabin, Tort
Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN L. REv.

1513, 1513-14 (1985).
14).

5. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (discussed infra text accompanying note

6. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (en banc) (discussed
infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text).
7. For a listing of jurisdictions, see infra note 24.
8. 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
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But disgruntled plaintiffs, seeking the benefit of tort causes of action, will
undoubtedly seek to circumvent the U.C.C. by contending that the U.C.C.
should not apply at all. Moreover, it follows that the benefits of Seely will
probably only be visited upon disputes not involving ordinary consumers
who, to the extent they suffer economic loss, will still have the full panoply
of U.C.C. and tort weapons at their disposal.
This article will address the twenty-year debate between the Santor and
Seely approaches, and explore the reasons for the seeming triumph of the
Seely doctrine. The Supreme Court's decision in East River will be addressed,
followed by a discussion of cases and commentary which now appear to have
largely resolved the debate in favor of Seely. This resolution is defended on
the basis of sound contractual and economic theory, with the suggestion that
appropriate use of contractual language can largely moot the issue.
II. Tim Santor-Seely DEBATE AND ITS AFTERMATH
Before embarking on a brief exploration of Santor and Seely, and their
progeny, two parameters are in order concerning the definition of "economic
damages" and the field of "products liability" as compared to other areas
of tort law.
First, the lines between personal injury, economic loss, and property
damage are not always easy to draw but are nevertheless manageable. In the
"paradigmatic products liability action" 9 resulting in bodily injury to a consumer, the product itself, typically owned by the consumer, is usually damaged or destroyed. But such damage rarely becomes an issue in such products
cases, presumably due to the relatively small monetary amount of such damage and its coverage by insurance.' 0 Economic loss covers damages broader
than that resulting immediately from the tortious event. Thus, such damages
will typically include "direct" economic loss (e.g., deterioration or internal
breakage of the product, loss of the bargain, costs of replacement and repair)
and "consequential" loss (e.g., lost profits). Property damage usually refers
to physical damage to property, other than the product itself (the latter being
designated as a direct economic loss)."
9. Id. at 2300.
10. Note, Economic Loss in ProductsLiability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUAM. L.
REv. 917, 957 (1966).
11. Id. at 918. Courts have usually applied these remedial distinctions in the
relevant cases. E.g., East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2300; Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford
Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 566, 489 A.2d 660, 665 (1985). This is not to deny that the
lines are sometimes blurred. Ribstein, Guidelinesfor Deciding Product Economic
Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REv. 493, 498-500 (1983); Note, Manufacturers'Liability
to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 539, 548 n.54 (1966) [hereinafter Penn. Note]; Note, Privity Revisited:
Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product'sSelf-Inflicted Dam-
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Second, the question of recovery of such damages in products cases
should be differentiated from the related issue of recovery of economic loss
in the non-products (typically negligence) context. While much of the caselaw
denies recovery in such contexts,' 2 it nevertheless concerns policies largely
age, 84 MicH. L. REv. 517, 518 & n.10 (1985) [hereinafter Michigan Note]; see infra
note 39.
One authority sums up the distinction as follows:
The distinction between "property damage" and "economic loss" is
not always a clear one. Although there is little difficulty when a product
causes physical damage to other property (property damage) or when the
only damage is loss of use of the product itself or other consequential
economic losses (economic loss), substantial difficulties arise when there is
"damage" to the product itself. The most common approach is to treat
damage to the product itself as "property damage" when it results from a
sudden calamitous occurrence or accident which could endanger people or
other property, but to treat such damage as "economic loss" when it does
not result from such an accident.
Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593, 595 n.8
(1986).
A less confusing term might be "commercial loss," as used in the Product
Liability Reform Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The Act defined that
term as "economic injury, whether direct, incidental, or consequential, including
property damage and damage to the product itself, incurred by persons regularly
engaged in business activities consisting of providing goods and services for compensation." Id. § 102(a)(5); cf. id. § 102(a)(7) (defining "economic loss" as "pecuniary
loss" subject to empirical measurement and confirmation). For further discussion of
the Act, see infra note 28.
12. See generally Rabin, supra note 4; Schwartz, Economic Loss in American
Tort Law: The Example of J'Aire and of ProductsLiability, 23 SAN Dmco L. REv.
37 (1986). Most courts explicitly observe the distinction between products and nonproducts cases, e.g., East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302 n.6; Spring Motors Distrib. v.
Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 576-77, 489 A.2d 660, 671 (1985), while other cases
observe it silently, e.g., People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J.
246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985) (permitting, in certain circumstances, recovery of economic
loss for negligent conduct, with no discussion of Seely or Santor); J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (same). Still other
courts apparently ignore the distinction and discuss recovery of economic loss in strict
products liability and negligence cases together. See Gaebler, supra note 11, at 59798. Nevertheless, some authorities insist that these two lines of cases should be treated
as one. See Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531,
1535 (9th Cir. 1986) (assuming, for purposes of reviewing sanctions imposed under
FED. R. Cwv. P. 11, that the holding in J'Aire was "adverse" to that in Seely); Note,
Warranty Law Revived by the East River Treatment: The Basis of the Bargain Redefined, 1986 CoLuI. Bus. L. REv. 201, 204 n.7 (citing J'Aire as "overruling" Seely).
One commentator, an advocate of the Santor line of cases, acknowledges this
lack of cross-citation but vigorously argues that the apparent trend toward permitting
recovery of economic loss in non-products torts cases should inform the Seely-Santor
debate. R. DurNr, R.EcovaY oF DAmAGEs FoR LosT PRoRTs 57-69 (2d ed. 1978 &
Supp. 1985). His argument is unconvincing, primarily because he fails to appreciate
the unique policies (e.g., strict liability) which underlie the products cases and gen-
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outside of the products field and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
With these guidelines in mind, we next turn to both the antecedents and
progeny of Santor and Seely. In this century, the growth of tort law for
personal injury actions was spurred by the fall of the privity barrier and the
judicial imposition of strict liability against manufacturers. These developments also held true for actions for damage to a product itself. However,
recovery for economic loss (particularly consequential loss) was almost always
left to contractual remedies, sounding in breach of express representations,
or breach of warranty under statute. Tort actions for such damages were
typically not permitted, except for cases involving fraud or interference with
13
contractual relations.
So stood the law when Santor and Seely were decided. Santor involved
an action for direct economic damages from defective carpeting. The court
permitted the plaintiff to recover damages to the carpet under either an
implied warranty theory or strict liability, holding that use of those doctrines
was not limited to cases involving the dangerousness of a defective product
to humans.

14

Shortly thereafter, the California Supreme court in Seely rejected the
Santor approach and severely limited a plaintiff's ability to recover economic
loss in tort actions. Seely concerned a truck that suffered from "galloping"
and other apparent defects in manufacture. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of express warranty, and in negligence and strict liability.
In an opinion written by Justice Traynor, the guru of strict products liability,1 5 the court permitted recovery of lost profits for breach of express
warranties.16 In lengthy dicta, however, the court rejected recovery under
tort theories for such damages. Initially, Traynor asserted that strict liability
had not been developed to swallow warranty law or the U.C.C., but only
"to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries" to persons.' 7 Warranty
rules, he argued, were appropriate for and functioned well in the commercial
setting.'8 Expressly disagreeing with Santor, Traynor stated that the use of
strict liability did not depend on the "luck" of receiving personal as opposed
erally have no application in the non-products field. See Spring Motors, 98 N.J. 555,
489 A.2d 660. Of course, the two lines of cases would seem easy to differentiate,
since it will be immediately obvious in most instances whether or not a product is
involved.
13. The summary of law in this paragraph is well developed at much greater
length in Note, supra note 10, at 919-42. See also PROSSIER & KEETON oN TORTS,
supra note 1, § 101, at 708-09.
14. 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
15. So characterized due to his pathbreaking opinion advocating use of strict
liability in products actions by consumers. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
16. 63 Cal. 2d at 14, 403 P.2d at 148.
17. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149.
18. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 149-50.
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to economic injury. Rather, he continued, the distinction rested "on an
understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products."' 19 The policies that underlie strict products liability-compensation for misfortune and loss spreading by the
manufacturer among customers-were not appropriate when only "business
needs" of a buyer were not met. 20 Justice Peters dissented from the latter
portion of Traynor's decision. Echoing Santor, he contended that products
liability law should apply to all types of damages, and that the record did
not demonstrate that the transaction involved was truly "commercial" in
nature. 21 Policies in favor of strict liability in the "consumer" setting applied
equally well, he felt, in the commercial setting where the buyer was an
"ordinary consumer" who, at the end of the retailing chain, lacked any
22
bargaining power.
While a few states have followed Santor,2a the overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions have adopted the Seely doctrine of denying recovery for
economic loss under tort in products cases. 24 In an apparent attempt at
19. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151.
20. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 151.
21. Id. at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 156-57 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
22. Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 157.
23. Apparently, only four decisions have explicitly followed Santor. See City
of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124
(1976); Cova v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267
(1975); Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 130
(1983).
24. See Sharp Brothers Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania law); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, 350 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1984); Monsanto Agricultural Prods. Co. v. Edenfield,
426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo
Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982) (summarily reversing on basis of dissent below which follows Seely. 81 A.D.2d 221, 227-34, 439
N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-40 (1981) (Silverman, J., dissenting)); Arrow Leasing Corp. v.
Cummins Arizona Diesel, 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983); Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (Iowa
law); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Price v. Gatlin,
241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
1977); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986) (South
Carolina law); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana
law); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978);
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); National
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Local
Joint Executive Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637 (1982); Star Furniture Co.
v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983) (Maryland law);
Cargill, Inc. v. Products Eng'g Co., 627 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Minn. 1986) (Wash-
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compromise, some states have charted an intermediate approach, generally
following Seely but adopting Santor when the tortious event could or did
endanger the persons of disappointed users. Such determinations depend on
the nature of the product defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which
the injury aroseY The commentators are somewhat divided as well, though
most seem to applaud the Santor doctrine or at least Justice Peters' approach
26
in Seely.
III.

THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW RESPONSE: East River

The Santor-Seely debate has been left to be resolved wholly to the caselaw, since neither the U.C.C. nor the appropriate provisions of the Restatement of Torts address the issue.27 Nor does federal legislation appear to
ington law) (dicta).
In some states, the caselaw still yields no definitive answer. See, e.g., Mead
Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio law
permits recovery for economic loss in strict liability but not in negligence). But see
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., No. C-1-84-988 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
4, 1986) (unpublished decision located on WESTLAW, DCT database) (adopts Seely
approach, citing the East River decision) [hereinafter Cincinnati Gas]. See generally
R. DuNN, supra note 12, at 58-68, for a review of the cases, some of which appear
to conflict even within a state. Part of the seeming inconsistency can be explained
by the distinction between products liability cases and general negligence cases. See
supra note 12.
25. See Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Ore. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978);
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.
1981) (Pennsylvania law); Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383,
306 S.E.2d 253 (1983). See generally East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
106 S.Ct. 2295, 2301-02 (1986).
26. For approval of Seely, see Schwartz, supra note 12; Speidel, Products
Liability, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 40 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1973); Wade, Tort
Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo.
L. REv. 1, 26 n.87 (1983); Manuel & Richards, Economic Loss in Strict Liability Beyond the Realm of 402A, 16 M sPHaS
ST. U. L. REv. 315 (1986); Gaebler, supra
note 11, at 620-27; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1, § 101, at 708-09;
Note, supra note 10; Penn. Note, supra note 11; Michigan Note, supra note 11.
For approval of Santor, see Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection:Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60
VA. L. REv. 1104, 1270-73 (1974); Ribstein, supra note 11; Edmeades, supra note 4;
see also infra notes 68-77 (discussing economic literature on the subject).
27. As correctly observed by the Supreme Court in East River, 106 S. Ct. at
2300 n.3, the authoritative RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), outlining
strict liability, simply does not address the issue. It is worth noting, however, that
both Professor Prosser, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960) and the Reporter for the Second
Restatement, Wade, supra note 26, support the Seely approach. In addition, the
U.C.C. warranty provisions do not address the issue. See Wade, supra note 26; Spring
Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 570, 489 A.2d 660, 668 (1985).
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be the answer in the near term.2 Recently, the United States Supreme Court,
applying its little used common law powers, 29 undertook in East River to
review the debate in the context of admiralty law and essentially adopted the
Seely approach. Despite the relatively narrow context in which it arose, East
River is worthy of notice given the depth of treatment devoted to the subject
and the likelihood that its reasoning will prove persuasive to state courts.
East River was a suit between companies that, respectively, built and
purchased turbines for installation on four super-tankers. Eventually, the
turbines malfunctioned, damaged themselves, and had to be replaced; one
malfunction occurred at sea during a storm off Alaska. The purchasers filed
suit under admiralty jurisdiction in federal district court, alleging that the
defendant manufacturer was strictly liable for defective design of the turbines, and liable (for one of the ships) for negligent supervision of the repair
28. A variety of bills were introduced in the 99th Congress in an effort to
"solve" the perceived liability "crisis." See generally Birnbaum, Tort Reform Proposals Analyzed, NAT'L L.J., June 23, 1986, at 15, col. 1. Several of the bills would
have excluded recovery for economic loss in products liability actions, but none were
passed by the 99th Congress. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2300 n.3 (listing bills pending
in Congress at the time of the decision).
The only "tort reform" bill to be reported out of a committee was the Product
Liability Reform Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). However, that bill never
reached a vote on the Senate floor before the 99th Congress adjourned. Nevertheless,
some provisions of this bill are relevant to this article. After defining "commercial
loss" in section 102(a)(5) (see supra note 11), the bill excluded recovery of such loss
from the coverage of the Act. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(a)(9) (1986)
(defining "harm" as personal injury). The Act preempted, under the Commerce
Clause, certain aspects of state tort law and set out uniform standards of products
liability to apply in federal and state courts. But according to the legislative history,
a "civil action for commercial loss is not subject to this bill and is to be governed
by applicable commercial or contract law." S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1986). This report, which accompanied S. 2760, went on to cite and favorably
discuss Seely and the Supreme Court's decision in East River, S. REP. No. 422, at
24, and concluded that "recovery for [commercial] losses is left to commercial law
and the Uniform Commercial Code. These losses are, in essence, contract damages
and not tort damages. They arise in the course of commercial dealings and can be
resolved through contracts and claims based on those contracts." S. REP. No. 422,
at 24 (footnotes omitted). This analysis is, of course, consistent with that developed
in this article.
29. The federal courts' common law powers, greatly circumscribed by Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), now are generally limited to admiralty
cases and, in certain cases, to filling the interstices of federal statutes and rules. See
generally Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HAzv. L.
REv. 881 (1986); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm.
L. Rmv. 1 (1985). It has already been suggested that East River will have persuasive
force in state and federal courts outside of the admiralty context. See Note, supra
note 12, at 201-02 n.4; Smith, Greene & Okun, High Court Ruling Could Facilitate
Summary Disposition of Tort Claims, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 26-27; see, e.g.,
Cincinnati Gas, supra note 24.
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of the turbines. Damages in the form of repair costs and lost income were
sought. 0 Suit was brought in tort alone, as breach of contract and warranty
claims were voluntarily dismissed when a statute of limitations defense was
interposed. 3 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant,
a decision affirmed by the Third Circuit sitting en banc, which applied the
"intermediate" approach described above. 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, in a unanimous decision
authored by Justice Blackmun. The first sentence of the opinion squarely
presented the issue and, as we shall see, charted some limits to the scope of
the decision: "[W]e must decide whether a cause of action in tort is stated
when a defective product purchased in a commercial transaction malfunctions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely economic loss." 33
After confirming the trend in the lower courts to incorporate concepts of
products liability predicated both on strict liability and negligence in admiralty cases, 3 4 the Court turned to the Santor-Seely debate at common law.
Initially, the Court discussed the development of products liability caselaw. This caselaw, the Court observed, "grew out of a public policy judgment that people need more protection from dangerous products than is
afforded by the law of warranty." 35 But the Court continued "if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract law would drown in a
sea of tort." 3 6 "The paradigmatic products liability action," the Court stated,
for bodily injury from a defective product can now proceed against the
manufacturer of the product without privity and with the benefit of strict
liability. 37 These doctrines have been extended to property damage aside from
the product itself.38 The present question was "whether injury to a product
39
itself may be brought in tort."
30. 106 S. Ct. at 2296-97.
31. Id. at 2297.
32. 752 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). The
"intermediate" test is described supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. 106 S. Ct. at 2296.
34. Id. at 2299.
35. Id. at 2299-2300 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403
P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965) (en banc)).
36. Id. at 2300 (citing G. GIfMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974)).
37. Id. (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (Cardozo, J.)).
38. Id.
39. Id. Strictly speaking, the East River decision concerned damage to the
turbines themselves (i.e., property damage, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text), not other forms of direct or consequential loss. See supra text accompanying
note 33. Indeed, the Court purported to "not reach the issue whether a tort cause
of action can ever be stated in admiralty when the only damages sought are economic." 106 S.Ct. at 2302 n.6. Clearly, though, the court's reasoning applies to the
whole range of economic loss, as that term is broadly defined, sought in products
actions. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 42.
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After reviewing the Seely, Santor, and intermediate approaches, 40 the
Court answered the question in the negative. The intermediate approach was
found "unsatisfactory" since it "turns on the degree of risk [and is] too
indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior.'"4 Even when the damage-causing event is "accident-like," the Court
continued, "the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its
bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law." ' 42 The Court rejected the minority approach because it failed to separate products liability
'4
and contract law and failed "to maintain a realistic limitation on damages.
Thus, the Court adopted "an approach similar to Seely" and held that, in
admiralty actions, "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship" would not
44
be liable under either negligence or strict liability for damage to the product.
Acknowledging "legitimate questions" about "restricting products liability"
in this manner, 45 the Court then addressed the arguments against its approach. Invoking Seely, the Court observed the "tort concern with safety"
is considerably lessened when economic loss is involved. 46 These losses can
be insured by a contracting party, and recovery of such losses is already
provided for through U.C.C. warranties. 47 Particularly in the commercial
context, "generally [not involving] large disparities in bargaining power,"
48
the parties should be left to the risks they have allocated in their contract.
The Court pointed out that economic loss is best characterized as "expectation damages" or "benefit of the bargain," the traditional contract remedies."9
Finally, the Court asserted that warranty actions have "built-in limitation[s] on liability" (such as the privity requirement and the foreseeability
of consequential damages rule), while no such limitations are available in
40.

106 S. Ct. at 2301.

41. Id. at 2302.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (citing E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.8, at 839-40).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2302-03 (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1977)); cf. Michigan

Note, supra note 11, at 520 n.30 (studies indicate that products liability insurance
can be obtained at a cost of about 101o of sales). At this point, the Court also stated
that the "increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer
liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified." East River, 106 S. Ct.
at 2302 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)

(L. Hand, J.)).
48. Id. at 2303 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960)).
49. Id. at 2303 & n.9 (citing, inter alia, R. PosNrER, EcoNoMfc ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 4.8 (3d ed. 1986) and Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929)

(the "hairy hand" case)).
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tort.5 0 Permitting tort claims "for all foreseeable claims for purely economic
loss could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums."' s Accordingly, "both

the nature of the injury and the resulting damages" makes the warranty, not
2

toft, remedy appropriate.1

Several characteristics of the East River decision serve as powerful predictors of the potential influence the opinion may have on the development
of the caselaw in the states. The first is the scholarly quality of the opinion,
carefully developing at length the arguments in favor of Seely and refuting
opposing rationale. With its frequent reference to leading cases in both tort
and contract, 3 East River can literally serve as a textbook example of a
court's struggle with the Santor-Seely dichotomy.
Equally noteworthy is the Court's explicit reference to economic analysis.
Judge Frank Easterbrook recently has suggested that the Supreme Court is
4
more sophisticated in its use of economic reasoning than at any prior period.
This sophistication, he contends, is demonstrated by ex ante perspectives as
opposed to ex post, "fairness" arguments, 55 and by reference to incentive
and marginal effects.5 6 These factors received full attention in East River:
the Court referred to the burden upon manufacturers if the Santor rule were
adopted in the commercial setting,5 7 and stated that the increased cost to the
public (passed along by manufacturers) of the Santor rule was not outweighed
by the benefits of the rule. 8 The Court added that the risk of economic loss,
50. Id. at 2303-04 (citing, inter alia, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
51. Id. at 2304.
52. Id. at 2303.
53. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.);
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
54. Easterbrook, The. Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward:The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HAzv. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1984). As an example of the Court's
prior unsophistication, Judge Easterbrook referred to Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953), where the Court held, with only vague references to "fairness," that contributory negligence would not be incorporated into the common law
of admiralty. Easterbrook, supra, at 29-30. In East River, the Court made one reference to Pope as authority for its power to exercise "traditional discretion in admiralty." 106 S. Ct. at 2302. Of course, Judge Easterbrook's view of what the Court
is or should be doing with economic analysis has not gone unchallenged. See Tribe,
ConstitutionalCalculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REv.
592 (1985).
55. Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 10-11.
56. Id. at 12-14.
57. 106 S. Ct. at 2302, 2304; see supra notes 41, 49, and accompanying text.
58. 106 S. Ct. at 2302; see supra note 45. The Court cited The Carroll Towing
case where Judge Learned Hand set forth his famous mathematical formula for
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allocated as a matter of law by tort principles, was better allocated by the
parties in their contracts in the commercial setting. 9 Thus, the Court seemed
to be explicitly adopting what in its mind was an efficient rule to govern this
apparent clash between policies of tort and contract law. Though not denominated as such, this reasoning is clearly modem economic analysis, not
mere pleas to justice or fairness.
East River clearly limited its adoption of the Seely rule to those cases
involving economic loss 6° flowing from commercial transactions between
businesses, or at least individuals of some business sophistication; the Court's
frequent reference to the virtues of the contractual relationship admits of no
other conclusion. But the caselaw among the states in this regard is not so
clear. 6' It is that caselaw, as well as an analysis of the validity of the Seely
rule, to which we now turn.

IV. Tim

DEBATE'S RESOLUTION: CONTRACTUAL REASONING AND ECONOMIC
ANALYsis

East River correctly resolved the Santor-Seely debate in favor of the
majority rule, and it can and should serve as a model for those states that
determining the existence of negligence. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302. Judge Hand
stated that a defendant was negligent if, and only if, the probability of an accident
occurring, multiplied by the gravity of resulting damage, is greater than the burden
of taking adequate precautions against the accident taking place. United State v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Richard Posner, among
others, has advanced the CarrollTowing formula as leading to an efficient economic
result. See R. POSNER, supra note 49, § 6.1.
59. 106 S. Ct. at 2303; see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. It is
also noteworthy that the Court cited at this point the 1986 edition of Judge Posner's
ECONOmic ANALYSIS OF LAw, the leading text in the field which espouses the positive
analysis of law and economics, a field largely headquartered at the University of
Chicago and led by Posner while he was a professor of law there. See L. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AimucAN LAW 693 (2d ed. 1985).
It is perhaps not surprising that the Court referred to such analysis, given its
explicit (e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court andAntitrustAnalysis: The (Near)Triumph
of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 319) or implicit (e.g., Easterbrook, supra
note 54) economic analysis in recent terms. East River demonstrates that reports of
the death of the law and economics movement are greatly exaggerated. Cf. Barnett,
Book Review, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1223, 1233-34 (1984) (arguing that the movement
has been in an intellectual decline in the 1980s).
60. While the Court spoke in terms of a malfunctioning product, "injuring
only the product itself and causing purely economic loss," 106 S. Ct. at 2296, it
would seem to follow that in a bifurcated case involving both personal injury and
economic loss, the former could be governed by strict liability principles while the
latter could be determined under warranty law. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 74;
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
23 (1965) (en banc). But see R. DuNN, supra note 12, at 63-64 (suggesting that in
such circumstances entirety of case would be governed by strict liability).
61. Dunn correctly observes that some of the cases which purport to follow
Seely are, nevertheless, unclear as to what is precisely meant by a "commercial
setting" or the impact, if any, on negligence actions in general. R. DUNN, supra note
12, at 65-66.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/2
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have not yet decided the issue. As observed by the Supreme Court, both the
nature of the injury and the resulting damage in a products liability case
causing economic loss lend themselves to contractual and warranty remedies,
not to resolution in tort. 62 Admittedly, the Santor position has some intuitive
appeal: why should strict liability not apply simply because of the "luck"
of the type of damage? Why should a manufacturer be "rewarded" when,
fortuitously, its defective product only caused economic loss? These apparent
calls for "fairness" ignore the underlying purposes of contract, particularly
the U.C.C., law and tort, particularly strict liability, law. The term "products
liability" has no talismanic significance. It should first be determined how
the product reached the user's hands and what type of damage it caused. If
only economic loss is caused, then the policy arguments in favor of strict
liability for a consumer are considerably lessened. The arguments are entirely
washed away if a typical consumer, with little bargaining power, is not
involved, but rather businesses or business persons are parties to the transactions. The risk of loss can be insured or appropriately contracted for, as
the parties see fit. On the other hand, a typical consumer will not have such
tools at his or her disposal, and such a plaintiff should be permitted to
recover property damage or economic loss through strict liability. Of course,
simply as a matter of definition, it would seem that typical consumers will
rarely suffer economic loss, other than damage to the product itself. The
EastRiver court also correctly rejected the "inter-mediate" approach between
Santor and Seely. 63 That approach has the virtue of compromise, but the
detriment of indeterminancy. Courts need to engage in difficult line-drawing
to determine when an accident which caused only economic loss nevertheless
was a life-endangering event. 64 Moreover, the line-drawing is unnecessary
since the two benchmarks suggested by East River-the commercial nature
of the transaction and the type of damage-are far easier to measure objectively. They also better serve the interests of contract and warranty law
supported by Seely and its progeny.
It is not without some irony or significance that the New Jersey Supreme
Court has recently retreated from a broad interpretation of Santor. In Spring
Motors Distributors,Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,6 that court candidly acknowledged that Seely had emerged as the majority approach.6 The U.C.C. should
apply, the court stated, "between commercial parties with comparable bargaining power." ' 6 At the same time, however, the court eliminated any "ver62. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2303.
63. Id. at 2302.
64. The lower court decision in East River struggled with this line-drawing.
Compare 752 F.2d at 909-10 (majority opinion) with id. at 913-15 (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting). The difficulty illustrated in the two opinions may have influenced the Supreme Court to discard that approach entirely. See also Schwartz,
supra note 12, at 74-76; Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 523.
65. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
66. Id. at 573-75, 489 A.2d at 669.
67. Id. at 576, 489, A.2d at 670.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [1986], Art. 2

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 51

tical privity" requirement under U.C.C. section 2-318, enabling a warranty
68
claim to be more easily brought by a plaintiff.
Thus, even the court that authored Santor now has thrown in the towel,
and virtually adopted the Seely approach. One remaining item of possible
dispute is the determination of the "commercialness" of a transaction, an
issue somewhat skirted by most of the cases, including Seely. A concurring
opinion in Spring Motors suggested that three factors be examined: (1) the
transaction's commercial nature, (2) the commercial experience of the parties,
69
and (3) whether the parties had comparatively equal bargaining power.
Seely, on the other hand, stated that equal bargaining power was unnecessary.70 It is best to leave this inquiry to case-by-case development; an objective
inquiry would be ideal, but it will be virtually unavoidable for courts to
examine the more subjective factors suggested by the Spring Motors concurrence. 7' Any such subjectivity, however, should be kept to a minimum
lest it undermine the result of Seely.
68. Id. at 583-89, 489 A.2d at 675-77. The Supreme Court took the opposite
tack in East River, finding the privity barriers in the U.C.C. warranty provisions to
be supportive of the narrower scope of liability in contract law. Hence, the Court
determined that the more appropriate nature of contract law should serve as the basis
for a remedy for economic loss. 106 S. Ct. at 2304; accord Michigan Note, supra
note 11.
The Spring Motors opinion explicitly stated what EastRiver appeared to assume,
that is, it was far easier to prevail under strict products liability than contract law.
98 N.J. at 570, 489 A.2d at 668. Some commentators, though, think the differences
are more apparent than real. See Note, supra note 10, at 959-64; Penn. Note, supra
note 11, at 544-48. See generally Razook, The Ultimate Purchaser'sand Remote
Seller's Guide Through the Code Defenses in ProductEconomic Loss Cases, 23 AM.
Bus. L.J. 85 (1985); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 57-70.
69. 98 N.J. at 593, 489 A.2d at 680 (Handler, J., concurring).
70. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Justice Peters
dissented partially on the basis that, in his view, plaintiff Seely was not sufficiently
involved in a "commercial" transaction and was more like a typical consumer. Id.
at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 156-57, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30.
71. Courts have examined a similar combination of objective and subjective
factors in determining whether the unconscionability rule, particularly as embodied
in U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977), applies in "commercial settings." See J. WmriE & R.
SUMMRS, UlnORI

COMMERCUl.

CODE

§ 4-9, at 170-73 (2d ed. 1980); cf. Michigan

Note, supra note 11, at 538-39 n.144 (noting difficulties in distinguishing commercial
buyers from consumers).
A definition utilized by the proposed federal Product Liability Reform Act, see
supra notes 11 & 28, is a sound one. There "commercial" parties are defined as
those "persons regularly engaged in business activities consisting of providing goods
and services for compensation." S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1986)
(explaining section 102(a)(5) of the Act, which defined "commercial loss"). This
inquiry is essentially objective in nature and avoids the pitfalls of a subjective determination of the parties' "bargaining power," as suggested by the Peters' opinion in
Seely and the concurring opinion in Spring Motors.
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The Seely rule in general, and its limitation to a commercial setting in
particular, is supported by economic analysis of contract and products liability law. Economic theory tells us that the rule of liability, whether it be
strict liability, negligence, or some other, will not matter since the affected
parties will achieve an efficient allocative outcome through bargaining
"around" the rule in a fre& market.7 However, this injunction carries less
force in a real world of high transaction, administrative, and informational
costs. 73 As parties to transactions (e.g., buyers of products) carry imperfect

knowledge, there is more justification for imposing a rule of liability on the
manufacturer.74 The more informational symmetry there is between manufacturers and consumers, though, the less justification there is to discard the
market solution in favor of one imposed by tort or contract law. 7s
Application of these principles illustrates the efficiency of the Seely rule.
An imperfect marketplace and the typical individual consumer's lack of information about a product may justify imposition of a strict liability rule. 76
72. This result is obtained by applying the "Coase Theorem," as found in
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). It should be noted
that economic efficiency is referred to in this article as only one of several normative
justifications for preferring the Seely rule. See also infra note 73. For problems
encountered by exclusive reliance on efficiency theories, see Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 277-83 (1986).
73. See A. PoLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-14 (1983);
R. PosNER, supra note 49, ch. 2.
74. A. PoLINSKY, supra note 73, at 95-104; R. POSNER, supra note 49, § 6.6;

Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-6 (1980). See generally Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J.
LEGAL SrtuD. 535 (1985). (It should be noted that the latter piece, despite its title,
does not explicitly address the issues raised in this article.)
75.

A. KRONmAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 & n.6

(1979); Bishop, The Contract-TortBoundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 241, 259 (1983).
More recently, Professor Bishop has advocated moving "away from the rigid
rule" in tort law generally prohibiting the recovery of pecuniary (i.e., economic) loss.
Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the
PecuniaryLoss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 369 (1986). This thesis is not in conflict

with that in the present article, since Seely only governs (or at least I argue should
only govern) in the commercial setting. In any event, Bishop's articles are somewhat
limited by their concentration on English cases and their failure to address the specific
issues or cases cited in this article. See also Rabin, supra note 4, at 1535-37 & nn.7274 (noting critically the paucity of specific economic analysis in this area).
76. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74. While, as outlined above, East River
in dicta strongly supported imposition of strict liability in personal injury actions,
106 S. Ct. at 2299-2300 (a view joined by Landes & Posner, supra note 74, among
others), this position has not gone unchallenged. Compare R. EPsTEin, MODERN
PRODUCTS LLITrry LAW ch. 5 (1980) (critical of current caselaw on strict liability

due to, among other things, interference with free market forces) and Priest; The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations
of Modern Tort Law, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 461 (1985) (same) with Sugarman, Doing
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However, the "commercial setting" of Seely, East River, and Spring Motors
presupposes fairly close symmetry of knowledge and economic acumen between the manufacturer and purchaser of the product. To be sure, this model
does not represent the perfect, efficient market either, but it is close enough
to make the market solution (the contract negotiated by the parties) appro77
priate, as opposed to a tort solution imposed by law.
The previous paragraphs have focused, in the construct of East River,
on the "nature of the injury. ' 78 East River has also asserted that the nature
of the damages supported the Seely approach. 79 Expectation damages enable
a business person to receive the benefit of his or her bargain (had the contract
been completed); damages usually awarded in tort cases place the plaintiff
in the position he or she would have been but for the accident. 0 To adopt
the Santor-tort approach in a commercial setting would, incongruously, perAway with Tort Law, 73 CA~n'. L. Ruv. 555 (1985) (arguing that products liability
law does not serve goals of compensation or deterrence and should be replaced by a
no-fault compensation scheme). See generally Schwartz, Directionsin Contemporary
Products Liability Scholarship, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 763 (1985).
One might argue that information asymmetry does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that greater liability should fall on the manufacturer of a product. Put
another way, it can be argued that consumers, at relatively little cost (e.g., by reading
Consumer Reports) can obtain safety information about products and that, therefore,
it is more economically efficient for contractual remedies (i.e., implied or express
warranties under the U.C.C.) to be applied rather than strict liability. See Danzon,
Comment on Landes and Posner, 15 J. LEGAL. ST. 569, 571-73 (1985). The problem
with this theory is that it undoubtedly takes too optimistic a view of the cost to the
typical consumer of obtaining and processing such "safety" information. See Landes
& Posner, supra note 74, at 543-44 (cost of information will be disproportionate to
the benefit of a negotiated level of safety by the manufacturer, as distinct from one
imposed by law).
77. See A. POLiNSKY, supra note 73, at 25; A. K.RoNmAN & R. POSNER, supra
note 75, at 4-7. One need not be an adherent of the suprarational consumer, posited
by the law and economics school, in order to accept a proposition that Seely provides
a better rule than Santorwhen, on balance, a consumer enjoys some ability to obtain
and process information when purchasing a product. See Latin, Problem-Solving
Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAn'. L. Ruv. 677, 710-13 (1985);
Michigan Note, supra note 11, at 537-38; East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine,
752 F.2d 903, 914-15 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting), aff'd
sub nom. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 106 S.Ct. 2295 (1986).
For a general review and criticism of the concept of a "rational" consumer, see
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism andMarket Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics,
33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986). In circumstances of relative information symmetry
between the parties, the competitive market (i.e., the contract) will likely yield the
liability and/or remedy terms desired by the parties. See Priest, A Theory of the
ConsumerProduct Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. Ruv. 1386 (1983).
78. See supra 37-52, 59-60, and accompanying text.
79. East River, 106 S.Ct. at 2303.
80. Id. at 2303 & n.9.
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mit potentially vast economic damages to be awarded.1 Economic analysis
supports rejection of this result. When there is some symmetry of information
and bargaining power between the parties, it is efficient to allocate consequential economic damages only when they are a foreseeable or expected
result of the breach of contract. 82 These rules carry less force in a less perfect
market setting, and account for compensatory damages in tort law. Thus,
cabining the damages obtainable in an economic loss case also supports
adoption of the Seely principle.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Most of the states that have considered the issue have resolved the SeelySantor debate in favor of the former rule, a result followed by the United
States Supreme Court in East River. This resolution is supported both by
traditional doctrinal analysis as well as by newer, more sophisticated tools
of economic analysis. In light of this desirable trend in the courts, a legislative
solution to the debate would appear unnecessary.83 As suggested above, com81. Id. at 2304. At this point, the Court cited Perlman, Interference with
Contractand Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and ContractDoctrine,
49 U. Cm. L. REv. 61, 72 (1982). There, Professor Perlman stated that:
Economic relationships are intertwined so intimately that disruption of one
may have far reaching consequences .... Courts facing a case of pure
economic loss thus confront the potential for liability of enormous scope,
with no easily marked intermediate points and no ready recourse to traditional liability-limiting devices such as intervening cause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
One advocate of the Santor approach attempts to refute this argument: "The
duty of care only runs to avoidance of foreseeable risks of harm. The unlimited
liability the court foresees should not happen." R. DUNN, supra note 12, at 63; see
also People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 252-53, 495
A.2d 107, 116-18 (1985) (adopting "particular foreseeability" standard for use as
proximate cause standard in negligent, non-product economic loss cases). This argument fails because it glosses over (a) the distinction between causing an injury and
causing the damages resulting from the injury, and (b) the great difficulties, in economic loss cases, of limiting the foreseeability test except in arbitrary ways. See Rabin,
supra note 4, at 1522-26, 1534-39; see also Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and
the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL SrU=. 463, 463-64 & n.9,
499-500 (1980); McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of
Responsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 286 (1985); Landes &
Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109,
129 (1983).
82. This is a restatement of the famous Hadley v. Baxendale rule, cited by
the East River court. 106 S. Ct. at 2304. See R. POSNER, supra note 49, § 4.9; Barton,
The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 277, 286300 (1972); Kornhauser, An Introductionto the EconomicAnalysis of ContractRemedies, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 683 (1986).
83. See supra note 28. Should the subject be addressed in congressional legislation, see supra note 28, the Seely approach, as clarified in East River and Spring
Motors, should be codified.
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mercial parties would probably view the Seely approach as a salutory one,
since it removes one litigation weapon from the hands of their market adversaries. It seems likely, though, that the Seely rule will not apply to more
typical consumer plaintiffs to the extent they suffer economic loss. 84 Moreover, plaintiffs will attempt to circumvent the majority approach by contending that they are ordinary consumers, that the transaction was not
sufficiently commercial in nature, or that the U.C.C. should not apply at
all. An example of the latter argument would be the position that the contract
involved, in whole or in part, the rendition of services rather than the sale
of goods. 5 Whether businesses by use of contractual language can entirely
eliminate these difficulties is problematic; 6 still, it seems that with more
complete and detailed contracts, courts will be hard pressed to find information assymetry which would support a finding of "non-commercialness."
Likewise, manufacturers should consider placing in their sales contracts not
only the usual dislaimers off warranties, but limitation of remedies which
refer to economic loss and other damages potentially available in a Santortype lawsuit.
Nor should the mere application of the U.C.C. or contract law in general
leave businesses complacent. As Spring Motors demonstrates, courts have
84. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 61 ("The average consumer is rarely in
a position to suffer consequential losses such as loss of profits . . ").
85. The coverage of the U.C.C. is restricted to contracts concerning the sale
of goods worth over $500. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-106(1), 2-201(1) (1977). See generally
J. WmrE & R. Stmnrins, supra note 70, § 2-2, at 51-52. In Republic Steel Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinios law), the
court applied Seely "in light of the exhaustive contract provisions" between the
parties, id. at 184, and prior to that rejected a contention by the plaintiff that the
contract was for services, not delivery of goods. Id. at 180-81. Presumably, the
plaintiff wished to rely on general contract theories since the contract contained the
usual disclaimers and limitation of remedy clauses permitted by the U.C.C. Id. at
183. For a discussion of how this issue has been resolved in several economic loss
cases, see Gaebler, supra note 11, at 635-36.
86. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 181
& n.10 (7th Cir. 1986) (doubting that parties to an agreement can avoid application
of the U.C.C. merely by inserting language in the agreement itself characterizing the
transaction).
Another contractual method to anticipate these issues would be to place a choiceof-law provision in the contract which would apply the law of a state following the
Seely rule. Cf. East River, 106 S.Ct. at 2300-01 n.3 ("The issue is of concern in the
area of conflict of laws."). Whatever conflict of laws test would be applied to measure
the validity of such a provision, it will likely require some connection between the
transaction and the state chosen. See generally R. WEiNTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
COMNICT OF LAws 369-77 (3d ed. 1986). It seems likely that any such clause in a
contract between commercially sophisticated parties will be enforced. See, e.g., Sarnoff v. American Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1080-82 (7th Cir. 1986) (employment contract). For an example of the successful application of such a choiceof-law provision in the present context, see Cargill, Inc. v. Products Eng'g Co., 627
F. Supp. 1492, 1496 n.6 (D. Minn. 1986) (contract applied Minnesota law).
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become more willing to discard the privity requirements of the U.C.C. 7 Some
courts are even willing in certain egregious breach of contract actions to
permit recovery of punitive damages, a traditional reserve of tort law. 88 Thus,
resolution of the Seely-Santor debate may nevertheless spawn other issues.
87. See supra note 64. See generally J. Wrr= & R. Stmi mas, supra note 70,
§§ 11-2 to 11-7; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 59-61; Michigan Note, supra note 11;
see also Note, Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranty Exclusions Against Non-Privity
CommercialPurchasers:The Needfor Uniform Guidelines, 20 GA. L. REv. 461, 46566 (1986) (growing minority of states abandoning privity requirement in warranty
disputes between commercial parties).
88. See, e.g., Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983)
(New York law). See generally D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERIcAN REMEDIES 619-21
(1985); Note, DamageMeasurementsfor BadFaithBreach of Contract:An Economic
Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1986).
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